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Abstract. Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is
an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The
AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the
agents’ valuations for the outcomes are nonnegative). Every AMA mech-
anism is characterized by a list of parameters. By focusing on the AMA
mechanisms, we turn mechanism design into a value optimization prob-
lem, where we only need to adjust the parameters. We propose a linear
programming based heuristic for optimizing within the AMA family. We
apply our technique to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-
day exploit markets. We show that due to the nature of the zero-day
exploit markets, if there are only two agents (one offender and one de-
fender), then our technique generally produces a near optimal mecha-
nism: the mechanism’s expected revenue is close to the optimal revenue
achieved by the optimal strategy-proof and individually rational mecha-
nism (not necessarily an AMA mechanism).
Keywords: automated mechanism design · revenue maximization · mechanism
design · security economics · bug bounty
1 Introduction
Revenue maximizing mechanism design is a fundamental topic in algorithmic
game theory. Myerson [17] solved for the revenue maximizing mechanism for
selling a single item, subject to a technical condition called the monotone hazard
rate condition. Myerson’s optimal auction is surprisingly elegant. For example,
if every agent’s type is drawn from an identical and independent distribution,
then the optimal mechanism is simply the Vickrey auction [20] with a reserve
price. Unfortunately, Myerson’s technique does not generalize to more complex
settings. For example, when it comes to combinatorial auctions (auctions where
multiple items are for sale, and the agents bid on bundles of items), revenue
maximizing mechanism design remains an open problem. Another notable appli-
cation domain of revenue maximizing mechanism design is the sponsored search
auctions [13], where the search engines sell advertisement slots to advertisers,
aiming to maximize revenue besides other objectives. Even though no optimal
mechanisms have been derived for general combinatorial auctions or sponsored
search auctions, for restricted domains, well performing mechanisms have been
obtained based on a variety of revenue-boosting techniques [6,10,11,15,16].
There are several general revenue-boosting techniques. For example, we may
artificially increase the winning chance of lower bidders, in order to drive up the
competition faced by the higher bidders. As another example, we may artificially
discourage or outright ban certain outcomes, in order to prevent low-revenue
outcomes or force the agents to pay more to achieve the discouraged outcomes.
The above techniques form the basis of a family of mechanisms called the affine
maximizer auctions (AMA). Lavi et al. [14] conjectured that a combinatorial
auction is truthful if and only if it is an AMA mechanism, subject to technical
conditions. Likhodedov and Sandholm [15,16] studied revenue maximizing com-
binatorial auction design by optimizing within the family of AMA mechanisms.
The idea of optimizing within the AMA family is a general approach that can
be applied to many different mechanism design settings, because generally the
AMA mechanisms are well defined and the family contains a large number of
mechanisms. By optimizing within the AMA family, there is a good chance of
reaching a well-performing mechanism in terms of revenue. However, the issue
with optimizing within the AMA family is that every AMA mechanism is char-
acterized by |O| + n parameters, where |O| is the size of the outcome space O,
and n is the number of agents. For combinatorial auctions, |O| is exponential in
the number of items, which makes it computationally impractical to optimize
within the AMA family for this setting. Due to this, Likhodedov and Sandholm
only studied the AMA family for the case of selling two items. When there are
only two items, the number of parameters is small enough for the authors to
conduct optimization via grid-based gradient descent.3
In this paper, we propose a linear programming based technique for opti-
mizing within the AMA family. Every outcome corresponds to one variable in
our LP model. As a result, our technique can handle reasonably large number
of outcomes. For example, let us consider the case where |O| is a few hundred.
Running a LP with a few hundred variables is computationally tractable. On
the other hand, methods such as grid-based gradient descent are impractical.
We apply our new technique to a specific mechanism design problem. Our
paper focuses on revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploit
markets [12]. Zero-day exploits refer to software vulnerabilities that are not
3 The authors also proposed a restricted version of AMA called the VVCA mecha-
nisms. A VVCA mechanism is only characterized by 2n parameters, which makes it
much easier to optimize over. On the other hand, due to the fact that the VVCA
family is only a tiny subset of the whole AMA family, we lose revenue by focusing
only on it.
known to the software vendor. Trading zero-day exploits as legitimate business
is a recent trend in the security industry [5]. According to a price list collected
by Greenberg [9], the price of a zero-day exploit is between $5000 to $250,000.
There are venture capital backed security consulting companies whose business
model is selling zero-day exploits [7]. One of the companies mentioned in [7] even
offered one point five million US dollars for one new iOS exploit. The reason an
exploit can be priced so high is that generally it can stay alive for a long period
of time [2]. Unless the software vendor is informed about an exploit, there is
very low chance for an exploit to be discovered independently. To remedy this,
software vendors often run bug bounty programs, which are markets where the
software vendors buy exploits from security researchers [1,19].
Guo et al. [12] proposed a formal mechanism design model for zero-day exploit
markets. In the authors’ model, one exploit is being sold to multiple buyers over
a period of time [0, 1]. The model is different from the classic single-item auction
for the following reasons:
– There are two categories of buyers. The defenders buy exploits to fix them.
Typically there is only one defender, which is the software vendor. The of-
fenders buy exploits to utilize them. National security agencies and police
are example offenders. For example, Zerodium [7] is a consulting company
that buys zero-day exploits and resells them to mostly government agen-
cies. The offenders wish to utilize an exploit for as long as possible. Once
an exploit is obtained by a defender, the exploit becomes worthless. Using
mechanism design terminologies, the buyers have externalities.
– The item being sold is an informational item, which means that we can sell
the same item multiple times (e.g., to multiple offenders). Of course, once
an exploit is sold to a defender, we cannot sell it to any offenders afterwards,
because it has become worthless.
– Because the item being sold is a piece of information, we cannot simply de-
scribe it in full details to the buyers without some kind of payment enforcing
mechanism, because otherwise the buyers can walk away with the exploit for
free. Furthermore, we cannot ask the buyers to bid on an exploit that car-
ries no description, because the buyers cannot come up with their private
valuations if no description is given.
Guo et al. [12] proposed a mechanism property called straight-forwardness:
a mechanism is straight-forward if it describes the exploit in full details to the
offenders, before they submit their bids. This is required because typically of-
fenders already have many exploits in their arsenals. With full description, they
can evaluate whether the exploit being sold is original, and to what extent the
exploit helps them. Straight-forwardness does not require the mechanism to de-
scribe the exploit to the defenders before they bid (otherwise, the exploit gets
fixed). Straight-forwardness only describes to the defenders how severe the ex-
ploit is: e.g., this exploit allows anyone to remotely control an iOS device. From
the perspective of a defender, every exploit is new (otherwise, it wouldn’t be an
exploit). We ask the defenders to come up with their private valuations based
on the exploit’s severity, which is exactly how bug bounty markets operate (in
bug bounty markets, bugs are priced according to their severity levels [19]).
Guo et al. [12] showed that if straightforwardness is required together with
strategy-proofness and individual rationality, then one revenue-maximizing mech-
anism must work as follows: we describe the exploit in full details to all offenders
at time 0. We also describe the exploit’s severity level to the defenders at time
0. The offenders and defenders submit their bids. The offenders bid to keep the
exploit alive for as long as possible. The defenders bid to kill off the exploit as
early as possible. In some sense, the model is similar to the cake-cutting prob-
lem [3,4] and the single facility location problem [8,18].4 For this model, the
authors proposed one heuristic-based randomized AMA mechanism.
In this paper, for the above model, we use our new technique to optimize
within the AMA family. We also show that if there are only two agents (one
offender and one defender), and if the defender’s valuation is much lower than
the offender’s (typically true for zero-day exploit markets), the optimal AMA
mechanism’s revenue is close to the optimal revenue. For demonstrating this
result, we propose and study a family of mechanisms called the posted-price
mechanisms for our model.
2 Model Description
We use O to denote the outcome space. We use Θi to denote agent i’s type space.
We use vi(θi, o) to denote agent i’s valuation for outcome o ∈ O when her type
is θi ∈ Θi.
For the zero-day exploit mechanism design model proposed in Guo et al. [12],
the outcome space is [0, 1]. An outcome o ∈ [0, 1] represents when the exploit is
killed off (revealed to the defenders).5 In order to run the technique proposed in
this paper, we require the outcome space to be finite. So for this technical reason,
we set the outcome space to be {0, 1
k
, 2
k
, . . . , 1}. That is, we will only reveal the
exploit at these discrete moments. The size of the outcome space |O| = k + 1.
The family of AMA mechanisms is defined as follows:
– Given a type profile θ, the outcome picked is the following:
o∗ = argmax
o∈O
(
n∑
i=1
uivi(θi, o) + ao
)
– Agent i’s payment equals:
maxo∈O
(∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o) + ao
)
−
∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o
∗)− ao∗
ui
4 In our model, we allow payments. After all, the objective is to maximize revenue.
5 If we allow randomized mechanisms, then an outcome is a nonincreasing function
o(t), with o(0) = 1 and o(1) = 0. o(t) represents the probability for the exploit to
be alive at time t.
In the above description, the ui and the ao are constant parameters. ui ≥ 1 for
all i. The ao are unrestricted. In total, there are n+ |O| parameters. Every AMA
mechanism is characterized by these many parameters. For any assignments of
the parameters, the corresponding AMA mechanism is strategy-proof. However,
not every AMA mechanism is individually rational. If we further assume that
∀i, θi, o, vi(θi, o) ≥ 0, then every AMA mechanism is individually rational. To
show this, we only need to show that an agent’s valuation is always at least her
payment. That is,
vi(θi, o
∗) ≥
maxo∈O
(∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o) + ao
)
−
∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o
∗)− ao∗
ui
⇐⇒
∑
j
ujvj(θj , o
∗) + ao∗ ≥ max
o∈O

∑
j 6=i
ujvj(θj , o) + ao


The right-hand side is less than or equal to the left-hand side if every agent’s
valuation for every outcome is nonnegative.
In our model, an outcome represents when the exploit is killed off. For pre-
sentation purpose, we sometimes use t to refer to an outcome.
An offender’s valuation is defined as:
vi(θi, t) =
∫ t
0
fθi(x)dx
A defender’s valuation is defined as:
vi(θi, t) =
∫ 1
t
fθi(x)dx
An offender “enjoys” the exploit from time 0 to t, and a defender values
the safe period from time t to 1. fθi(x) represents agent i’s instantaneous value
(nonnegative) at time x, when her type is θi. Based on the above definitions
of the agents’ valuations, we have that every AMA mechanism is individually
rational for our model.
3 Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions
We recall that an AMA mechanism is characterized by n + |O| parameters
(ui for every agent i, and ao for every outcome o). For presentation purpose,
we define Z = n + |O| and use p1, p2, . . . , pZ to refer to the parameters. Let
M(p1, p2, . . . , pZ) be the AMA mechanism characterized by p1 to pZ . The task
of optimizing within the AMA family is simply to optimize over the parameters:
max
p1,p2,...,pZ
ER(M(p1, p2, . . . , pZ))
Here, ER(M) represents mechanism M ’s expected revenue. We have analyt-
ical characterization of the AMA payments, so the revenue of M given a specific
type profile can be calculated accordingly. Unfortunately, there is no known
short-cut for calculating the expected revenue. Given a prior distribution of the
θi, we need to draw large amount of sample profiles to calculate the expected
revenue. For example, if for every agent i, we draw 100 samples for θi, then
altogether the number of type profiles is 100n. For this reason, in this paper, we
focus on cases where n is small.6
Likhodedov and Sandholm [15,16] used a grid-based gradient descent ap-
proach for optimizing the parameters. Under this approach, suppose we start
from a grid point (p1, p2, . . . , pZ), we have to examine all neighbouring points
(p1 + δ1h, p2 + δ2h, . . . , pZ + δZh), where δi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and h is the grid size.
We need to examine 3Z points. So this approach requires that both n and |O|
be tiny. For example, if Z = 100, then the approach is impractical. For our
technique, Z is allowed to be large: our technique involves a LP model with Z
variables, which takes polynomial time in Z.
A high-level description of our optimizing technique is as follows:
– We initialize the algorithm with an AMA mechanism: e.g., one based on
random parameters, or the VCG mechanism.
– Given M0 characterized by p
0
1, p
0
2, . . . , p
0
Z , we use a heuristic to approxi-
mate the optimal AMA mechanism near this starting point, using a linear
program. A mechanism M (characterized by p1, p2, . . . , pZ) is near M0 if
maxi |pi − p
0
i | ≤ ǫ for a threshold ǫ. We repeat this step using the new
mechanism as the starting point.
The above algorithm may end with a locally optimal mechanism, which
means that we may need to repeat the algorithm using different initial points.
Now we present the details of the linear program. We index the outcomes us-
ing 0, 1, . . . , k. We denote the initial mechanism asM(u01, u
0
2, . . . , u
0
n, a
0
0, a
0
1, . . . , a
0
k).
The following optimization model solves for the optimal AMA mechanism
near this starting point:
Model 1
Variables: u1, u2, . . . , un, a0, a1, . . . , ak
Maximize: ER(M(u1, u2, . . . , un, a0, a1, . . . , ak))
Subject to:
For all i, ui ≥ 1 and u
0
i − ǫ ≤ ui ≤ u
0
i + ǫ
For all t, a0i − ǫ ≤ ai ≤ a
0
i + ǫ
Of course, the above model is not a linear program, as ER(M) is not a
linear combination of the variables. We will approximate ER(M) using a linear
combination of the variables.
Let S be a large set of type profiles, we will approximate ER(M) as follows:
ER(M) ≈
∑
θ∈S
P (θ)
∑
i
Ci(M, θ)
6 We have to emphasize that this is not an uncommon constraint when it comes to
using numerical methods for maximizing mechanism revenue.
Here, Ci(M, θ) is agent i’s payment under M when the type profile is θ. One
way to pick S is to discretize the type space and let S be the set of all grid
points. Now what remains to be done is to approximate Ci(M, θ) using a linear
combination of the variables.
Ci(M, θ) =
maxo∈O
(∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o) + ao
)
−
∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o
∗)− ao∗
ui
Here, o∗ is defined as
o∗ = argmax
o∈O
(
n∑
i=1
uivi(θi, o) + ao
)
We use the following heuristic to approximate Ci(M, θ): because the ui and
the ao are close to the u
0
i and the a
0
o, we will use the u
0
i and the a
0
o to calculate
the outcomes mentioned in the above expressions. That is, we assume that for
most type profiles, small perturbation in the parameters will not change the
mechanism outcomes.
o∗0 = argmax
o∈O
(
n∑
i=1
u0i vi(θi, o) + a
0
o
)
o0 = argmax
o∈O

∑
j 6=i
u0i vi(θi, o) + a
0
o


We replace o∗ and o using o∗0 and o0, we have that
Ci(M, θ) ≈
∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o
0) + ao0 −
∑
j 6=i ujvj(θj , o
∗0)− ao∗0
ui
We use cj to denote vj(θj , o
0) and c∗j to denote vj(θj , o
∗0). Both the cj and
the c∗j are constants.
Ci(M, θ) ≈
∑
j 6=i cjuj + ao0 −
∑
j 6=i c
∗
juj − ao∗0
ui
We then observe that for any x, x
ui
= x
u0
i
−
x(ui−u
0
i
)
uiu
0
i
.
We can then rewrite Ci(M, θ) into:∑
j 6=i cjuj + ao0 −
∑
j 6=i c
∗
juj − ao∗0
u0i
−
(
∑
j 6=i cjuj + ao0 −
∑
j 6=i c
∗
juj − ao∗0)(ui − u
0
i )
uiu
0
i
The first term is a linear combination of the variables, as u0i , the cj , and the
c∗j are all constants.
The second term can be approximated as follows:
(
∑
j 6=i cju
0
j + a
0
o0 −
∑
j 6=i c
∗
ju
0
j − a
0
o∗0)(ui − u
0
i )
u0iu
0
i
The above is a linear function involving one variable (ui).
Using the above heuristic method, we are able to turn Model 1 into a linear
program involving n+ |O| variables. The number of constraints is n+ |O|+ |S|.
Therefore, we can afford reasonable large n and |O|, as long as |S| is not too
large.
4 Zero-Day Exploit Mechanism Design Model
In this section, we focus on a specific mechanism design setting for the zero-day
exploit model: there are only two agents: one offender and one defender.
We use EPO(M) to denote the offender’s expected payment under mecha-
nism M . We use EPD(M) to denote the defender’s expected payment under
mechanism M .
Let F be the set of all strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms.
LetM∗ be the optimal mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue. We
recall that ER(M) denotes M ’s expected revenue.
M∗ = arg max
M∈F
(EPO(M) + EPD(M)) = arg max
M∈F
ER(M)
Let MO∗ be the optimal mechanism that maximizes the expected payment
collected from the offender.
MO∗ = arg max
M∈F
EPO(M)
Let MD∗ be the optimal mechanism that maximizes the expected payment
collected from the defender.
MD∗ = arg max
M∈F
EPD(M)
Obviously, we have
ER(M∗) = EPO(M∗) + EPD(M∗) ≤ EPO(MO∗) + EPD(MD∗)
We introduce the following posted-pricemechanisms. These mechanisms allow
only one agent to make decisions.
– Every outcome o is associated with a price ao.
– One agent picks the outcome that maximizes her own utility.
– The other agent makes no decisions and pays 0.
It is without loss of generality to assume that bothMO∗ andMD∗ are posted
price mechanisms. LetMO∗ be the mechanism that maximizes the offender’s ex-
pected payment. Let EPO(M, θD) be the offender’s expected payment under M
when the defender bids θD. BecauseEPO(MO
∗) =
∑
θD
P (θD)EPO(MO
∗, θD),
there must exist one θD so that EPO(MO
∗, θD) ≥ EPO(MO
∗). If we fix the
defender’s type to be the said θD, then the mechanism faced by the offender is
exactly a posted-price mechanism, and the expected payment of the offender is
at least EPO(MO∗).
For zero-day exploit market, typically the defender has much lower valuation
than the offender. For example, according to [9], an exploit that attacks the
Chrome browser sells between 80k and 200k for offensive clients (USD). Accord-
ing to Google’s official bug bounty reward program for the Chrome browser [19],
a serious exploit is priced between 0.5k and 15k. Therefore, EPD(MD∗) is gen-
erally much smaller than EPO(MO∗).
We use PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak) to denote the posted-price mechanism with the
parameters a0 to ak. We useM(uO, uD, a0, a1, . . . , ak) to denote the AMA mech-
anism with the parameters uO (for offender), uD (for defender), and the at. If the
deciding agent under PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak) is the offender, then PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak)
approaches M(uO, 1, 0,−a1uO, . . . ,−akuO), when uO approaches infinity. If the
deciding agent under PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak) is the defender, then PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak)
approachesM(1, uD,−a0uD, . . . ,−ak−1uD, 0), when uD approaches infinity. For
any posted-price mechanism, there exists an AMA mechanism whose expected
performance is arbitrary close to it. That is, the optimal AMA mechanism’s
expected revenue is at least the optimal expected revenue of posted-price mech-
anisms.
We solve for the optimal posted-price mechanism for the offender, denoted
as PP ∗.
ER(PP ∗) = EPO(M∗) ≥ ER(M∗)− EPD(MD∗)
Because the optimal AMA mechanism outperforms PP ∗ (or they have the
same expected revenue), when EPD(MD∗) is small, we have that the optimal
AMA mechanism’s expected revenue is close to the expected revenue of the
optimal mechanism M∗.
4.1 Optimal Posted-Price Mechanism
In this subsection, we discuss how to solve for the optimal posted-price mecha-
nism.
First of all, we focus on the single-parameter setting [12]. For presentation
purpose, we focus on solving for the optimal posted-price mechanism where the
offender makes decisions.
In a single-parameter setting, an offender’s valuation is defined as follows,
assuming her type is θO:
v(θO, t) =
∫ t
0
θOc(x)dx
c(x) is a fixed function that characterizes the instantaneous valuation of the
exploit by the agent. At time x, the instantaneous valuation is θOc(x).
We use Myerson’s standard technique. We assume θO ∈ [0, H ], where H is
a fixed upper bound. We assume θO’s pdf and cdf are f and F , respectively.
We also assume the following expression is monotone nondecreasing. This is
called the monotone hazard rate condition, which is satisfied by many common
distributions.
φ(θO) = θO −
1− F (θO)
f(θO)
It turns out that if the above all hold, then the optimal post-price mechanism
simply sells the whole time interval [0, 1] as a bundle, with a fixed take-it-or-
leave-it price p. If the agent is willing to afford p to buy the whole interval,
then she gets it. Otherwise, she gets nothing and pays nothing. The optimal
mechanism PP ∗ = PP (0,∞,∞, . . . ,∞, p).
When k is small, we have another algorithm for solving for the optimal
posted-price mechanism, and under this algorithm, we can drop the single-
parameter assumption.
Let PP (a0, a1, . . . , ak) be the optimal posted-price mechanism. It is without
loss of generality to assume that for any i < j, if both ai and aj are finite,
then ai < aj . Otherwise, the outcome i is never chosen, and we can set ai to
be infinite. It is also without loss of generality to assume that for any ai, either
it is infinite (meaning that this outcome is not allowed), or it must satisfy the
following condition:
∃θO, v(i, θO)− ai = max
j<i
v(j, θO)− aj
Here, v(t, θO) is the offender’s valuation for outcome t when her type is θO.
The above condition basically says that there exists a type for the offender, if
we increase ai just a bit, then it would force the offender to choose an earlier
outcome than i. If the condition is not true, then we can safely increase aj . By
doing so, we can charge more for those types that choose j. We can also charge
more if under some types, the offender chooses a later outcome, which also means
that more payment will be collected.
Based on the above condition, if we know the aj for j < i and θO, then we
can calculate ai. We already know that a0 = 0. To calculate a1, we can go over
all θO, possibly by discretizing the offender’s type space. Then, to calculate a2,
we can go over all θO again. We do this for every i. Let N be the number of
types in ΘO after the discretization. The total number of iterations is then N
k.
5 Evaluation
As mentioned earlier, according to [9], an exploit that attacks the Chrome
browser sells for at most 200k for offensive clients (USD). According to Google’s
official bug bounty reward program for the Chrome browser [19], a serious exploit
is priced for at most 15k.
We start with the following setting, which is based on the numbers above.
There are two agents. The offender’s valuation function is
v(θO, t) =
∫ t
0
θO(1 − x)dx
θO is drawn uniformly at random from U(0, 400). That is, the offender’s valuation
for the whole time interval [0, 1] is at most 200.
The defender’s valuation function is
v(θD, t) =
∫ 1
t
θDxdx
θD is drawn uniformly at random from U(0, 15). That is, the defender’s valuation
for the whole time interval [0, 1] is at most 15.
The above valuation functions satisfy all the conditions needed for the single-
parameter model. So MO∗ simply sells the whole interval to the offender for a
fixed price pO, and MD
∗ simply sells the whole interval to the defender for a
fixed price pD.
pO = arg max
p≤200
pP (v(θO, 1) ≥ p) = arg max
p≤200
p
200− p
200
= 100
EPO(MO∗) = 50
pD = argmax
p≤15
pP (v(θD, 1) ≥ p) = argmax
p≤15
p
15− p
15
= 7.5
EPD(MD∗) = 3.75
Therefore, ER(M∗) is at most 53.75. We pick k = 10 and ǫ = 0.01. We use
the VCG mechanism as the initial solution. The VCG mechanism’s expected
revenue is 6.9, which is very far away from the upper bound. Our technique
starts from the VCG mechanism, and at the end produces a mechanism whose
expected revenue equals 50.6, which is very close to the upper bound 53.75. That
is, in this case, the optimal AMA mechanism’s expected revenue is close to the
optimal mechanism’s expected revenue.
As demonstrated in our analysis, we have the above phenomenon if the de-
fender’s valuation is insignificant compared to the valuation of the offender. We
then investigate an example where the defender’s valuation is much higher. We
change it so that the defender’s type is drawn from U(0, 150) instead of U(0, 15).
Now the upper bound for ER(M∗) is 87.5. Our technique produces a mechanism
whose expected revenue equals 57.9. This time, the achieved value is not close
to the upper bound.
6 Conclusion
Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach
for revenue maximizing mechanism design. We proposed a linear programming
based heuristic for optimizing within the AMA family. We applied our tech-
nique to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploit markets. We
showed that due to the nature of the zero-day exploit markets, with one offender
and one defender, our technique generally produces a near optimal mechanism.
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